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Abstract
A sufﬁcient and necessary condition is presented for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in n-person noncooperative games in normal form where strategy
sets are not necessarily convex. Under the convexity condition, we show that this
new sufﬁcient and necessary condition is a particular case of diagonal transfer
quasiconcavity. The result is illustrated with an application to an economy with
multilateralenvironmentalexternalitiesandtotheexistenceofaCournotequilibrium.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nash’s concept of equilibrium (Nash [1951]) is probably the most important solution in
non-cooperative game theory. It is immune from unilateral deviations, that is, each player
has no incentive to deviate from his/her strategy given that the other players do not deviate
from theirs. Nash [1951] has proved that a ﬁnite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Later on, Rosen [1965] has extended Nash’s result to inﬁnite games with con-
cave payoff functions and convex strategy sets. Nash equilibrium has been successfully
applied in many areas of economics including oligopoly theory, general equilibrium, and
social choice theory.
These applications have led researchers from different ﬁelds to investigate the possi-
bility of weakening Rosen’s Nash equilibrium existence conditions to further enlarge its
domain of applicability. Several results have already been obtained in this direction of
research. To mention but a few, see Nishimura and Friedman [1981], Lignola [1997],
Williams [1980], Rosen [1965], Friedman [1977], Yao [1992], Baye et al. [1993] and
Vives [1990]. Lignola [1997] has proven existence results for Nash equilibrium points
for two-person games in topological vector spaces and in reﬂexive Banach spaces with
E-mail address : (r.nessah, k.kerstens)@ieseg.fr
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lished the existence of Nash equilibrium points in n-person games when strategy sets are
closed and convex subsets of reﬂexive Banach spaces, each player’s cost functional is
concave in that player’s strategy, weakly continuous in the strategies of the other play-
ers, weakly lower semicontinuous in all strategies, and satisﬁes a coercivity condition
if any of the strategy sets is unbounded. Nash equilibrium has been studied in the case
where the payoff functions are concave, quasiconcave and 
-diagonally quasiconcave in
Rosen [1965], Friedman [1977] and Yao [1992], respectively. In Nishimura and Fried-
man [1981] the existence of Nash equilibrium is established for games where the payoff
functions are not concave, but satisfying a strong condition (see also Section 4 of this
paper). Baye et al. [1993] have established necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the
existence of Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games which may have discontinuous
and/or non-quasiconcave payoffs, but satisfying conditions called diagonal transfer qua-
siconcavity and diagonal transfer continuity. Reny [1999] has established the existence
of Nash equilibrium in compact and quasiconcave games where the game is better-reply
secure.1 Dasgupta and Maskin [1986] have established the existence of Nash equilibrium
for games where the strategy sets are non-empty, convex and compact, and players have
payoff functions that are quasiconcave, upper semicontinuous and graph continuous. It is
interesting to mention that, using lattice-theoretic methods and Tarski’s ﬁxed point the-
orem, Vives [1990] has established the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where
payoffs are upper semicontinuous and satisfy certain monotonicity properties.
Note that in general all the above-cited works and others, assume that all strategy sets
are convex. By contrast, in bargaining theory several contributions are dedicated to relax-
ing the convexity assumption on the set of feasible payoffs (containing the threat point).
Just to cite a few articles in this literature, the reader can consult Conley [1991, 1996],
Xu and Yoshihara [2006] and Zhou [1997], among others. For instance, the article by Xu
and Yoshihara [2006] provides a characterization of three classical bargaining solutions
(Nash, egalitarian, and Kalai-Smorodinsky) to a general, non-convex bargaining problem.
In line with Binmore [1987], one can therefore argue that more attention should be paid
to the structure of the primitive feasible set in bargaining theory as well as other ﬁelds in
game theory.
Developments in non-cooperative game theory remain somehow disconnected from
advances in micro-economic theory, where non-convexities in both consumption and pro-
duction have been discussed at least at the theoretical level since the 1960’s. Indeed, al-
ready Farrell [1959] forcefully argued to relax the convexity assumption in both consump-
tion and production and to examine the consequences for general equilibrium theory. One
main reason for non-convex production possibility sets is indivisibilities. For instance, in
production theory Scarf [1981a, 1981b, 1986] has repeatedly underscored the importance
of indivisibilities and the ensuing complexity for general equilibrium computations (be-
cause of the need of combinatorial optimization procedures). Bogetoft [1994] is a recent
example of a contribution proposing a variety of convex and non-convex non-parametric
empirical production models in a principal-agent framework. In addition, externalities
1A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u
resulting from strategies approaching x, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u
i
even if the others deviate slightly from x.
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(see Starrett [1972]). Finally, it sufﬁces to indicate that nonlinear pricing (due to two- and
three-part tariffs, quantity discounts, and other pricing policies) may induce non-convex
budget sets in general (e.g., Wilson [1993]).
The main purpose of this paper is to establish the existence of Nash equilibrium with-
out convexity of the strategy sets. This contribution proceeds as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce some notations and deﬁnitions. Section 3 presents an existence theorem and
examples. In Section 4, we make a comparison between our theorem and Nishimura and
Friedman’s theorem. Section 5 and 6 are dedicated to an application of the main new
result to an economy with multilateral environmental externalities and to the existence of
Cournot equilibrium in static models. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we recall some existence results of Nash equilibrium (Friedman [1977],
Abalo and Kostreva [2005] and Baye et al. [1993]). Consider the following noncoopera-
tive game in normal form:
G = (Xi; fi)i2I (1)
where I = f1;:::;ng is the ﬁnite set of players, X =
Q
i2I
Xi is the set of strategy proﬁles
of the game, where Xi is the set of strategies of player i; Xi  Ei, Ei is a topological
space. f = (f1;f2;:::;fn) where fi : X  ! R is the payoff function of player i. The aim
of each player in this game is to maximize his payoff function.
For each player i 2 I, we denote by  i; the set  i = fj 2 I such that j 6= ig. We also
denote by X i =
Q
j2 i
Xj the set of strategies of the players in coalition  i.
Let us ﬁrst introduce some notations and deﬁnitions. Consider Y a nonempty subset of
a vector space F. Let 2Y be the set of all nonempty parts of Y . A correspondence C
deﬁned from Y into 2F has a ﬁxed point x 2 Y if x 2 C(x). If C is a single-valued
function, then a ﬁxed point x of C is characterized by the equation x = C(x). A function
f : Y ! R is said quasiconcave on Y if for any y1, y2 in Y and for any  2 [0;1], we
have minff(y1); f(y2)g  f(y1 + (1   )y2). Let Y be any set, we denote by hY i the
set of all ﬁnite subsets of Y and let S  Y . Denote by int S the relative interior of S in
Y .
Diagonal Transfer Continuity. Let X be a subset of RL. A function f : X  X ! R
is said to be diagonally transfer continuous in x on X if for every (x;y) 2 X  X,
f(x;y) > f(x;x) implies that there exist some point y
0 2 X and some neighborhood
V (x)  X of x such that f(z;y
0) > f(z;z) for all z 2 V (x).
Baye et al. [1993]: Diagonal transfer continuity says that if a point x in X is upset by
a deviation point y in X, then there is an open set of points containing x, all of which can
be upset by a single deviation point y
0.
Diagonal Transfer Quasiconcavity. Let X be a convex subset of RL. A function
f(x;y) : X  X ! R is said to be diagonally transfer quasiconcave in y on X if,
3
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Xm = fx1;:::;xmg  X such that for any subset fxk1;xk2;:::;xksg  Xm, 1  s  m,
and any x 2 cofxk1;xk2;:::;xksg we have min
1ls
f(x;ykl)  f(x;x).
Baye et al. [1993]: Diagonal transfer quasiconcavity says that, given any deviation
proﬁle y, there exists a candidate proﬁle x that is not upset by y. Given any two deviation
proﬁles y1 and y2, there exist corresponding candidate proﬁles x1 and x2 such that x1 is
not upset by y1 and x2 is not upset by y2; and any weighted average (convex combination)
x = hx1 + (1   h)x2 with h 2 [0;1] is not upset by y1 and y1. For the general case, it
roughly says that given any ﬁnite set Y m of deviation proﬁles, there exists a corresponding
ﬁnite set Xm of candidate proﬁles such that, for any subset  Xr  Xm (r 2 [1;m]), its
convex combinations are not upset by all of the deviations in  Y r.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is said to be a Nash equilibrium of game (1) if
8i 2 I; 8yi 2 Xi; fi(x i;yi)  fi(x):
First let us recall some existence results for this equilibrium (Friedman [1977], Abalo
and Kostreva [2005] and Baye et al. [1993]).
Theorem 1 (Friedman theorem [1977]) Let I be an indexed ﬁnite set. Let Xi be a
nonempty convex and compact subset of Rni and fi : X 7! R such that
(1) fi is continuous over X,
(2) yi 7! fi(x i;yi) is quasiconcave over Xi, for each x i 2 X i.
Then, the game (1) has a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Abalo-Kostreva theorem [2005]) Let I be an indexed ﬁnite or inﬁnite count-
able set. Let fEigi2I be a family of metrizable locally convex topological vector spaces
and let Xi be a nonempty convex and weakly compact subset of Ei such that
(1) fi is continuous over X,
(2) argmax
yi2Xi
fi(x i;yi) is a singleton for each x i 2 X i.
Then, the game (1) has a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3 (Baye-Tian-Zhou theorem [1993]) Assume that for all i 2 I, the strategy




fi(x i;yi), 8(x;y) 2 X  X such that f(x;y) is diagonally transfer
continuous in x. Then, the game (1) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if f(x;y) is
diagonally transfer quasiconcave in y.
Let us consider the following example.
Example 1 Assume that in game (1) n = 2, I = f1;2g, X1 = X2 = [1;2] [ [3;4],





In this example, Xi is not convex, 8i 2 I, and the function yi 7! fi(x i;yi) is not quasi-
concave for i = 1. Therefore, Friedman theorem (Theorem 1), Abalo-Kostreva theorem
(Theorem 2) and Baye-Tian-Zhou theorem (Theorem 3) are not applicable.
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We can now state our main result which characterizes the existence of Nash equilibria
when the strategy set is compact, but does not satisfy the convexity condition.
Let us consider the following function: 	(x;y) =
n P
i=1
fi(x i;yi), 8(x;y) 2 X  X.
Theorem 4 Let I = f1;:::;ng be an indexed ﬁnite set. Let fEigi2I be a family of metric
spaces and let Xi be a nonempty and compact subset of Ei such that the function 	(x;y)
is diagonally transfer continuous in x. Then, the game (1) has a Nash equilibrium if and
only if 8A 2 hXi, 9x 2 X such that
max
y2A
	(x;y)  	(x;x): (2)
Condition (2) in Theorem 4 says that, given any ﬁnite set A  X of deviation proﬁles,
there exists a corresponding candidate proﬁle x 2 X such that x is upset by all of the de-
viations in A. We see that also in Theorem 4, the condition (2) is necessary and sufﬁcient
for the existence of a strategy Nash equilibrium without convexity assumption.
Note that by deﬁnition of the function 	, we have
8x 2 X; sup
y2X
	(x;y)  	(x;x): (3)
The following Lemma shows the relation between the function 	 and Nash equilibria
for the game (1).




Proof. Necessary condition. Let x 2 X be a Nash equilibrium for the game (1). Then,







8y 2 X, i.e., sup
y2X




Sufﬁcient condition. Let x 2 X be a strategy proﬁle such that sup
y2X
	(x;y) = 	(x;x).
This equality implies 8y 2 X, 	(x;y)   	(x;x) =
n P
i=1
ffi(x i;yi)   fi(x)g  0. Let
i 2 I be arbitrarily chosen, we have 8y 2 X, 	(x;y)   	(x;x) = fi(x i;yi)   fi(x) +
n P
j=1;j6=i
ffj(x j;yj)   fj(x)g  0. For y 2 X such that yi is arbitrarily chosen in Xi and
yj = xj, 8j 6= i, we obtain then
n P
j=1;j6=i
ffj(xj;yj)   fj(x)g = 0. Then, from the last
inequality we deduce that 8yi 2 Xi, fi(x i;yi)  fi(x). Since i is arbitrarily chosen in
I, we have 8i 2 I, 8yi 2 Xi, fi(x i;yi)  fi(x). Thus, x is a Nash equilibrium for the
game (1).
Taking into account the inequality (3) and Lemma 1, we deduce the following propo-
sition.
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f	(x;y)   	(x;x)g: (4)
Then, the game (1) has at least one Nash equilibrium if and only if  = 0.
Proof of Theorem 4. Sufﬁcient condition. Suppose that
8x 2 X; 9y 2 X such that 	(x;y) > 	(x;x): (5)
Then, X can be covered by the sets
y = f x 2 X such that 	(x;y) > 	(x;x)g; y 2 X:
























int y. Then, thereexists
y 2 X such that x 2 y, i.e., 	(x;y) > 	(x;x). By the diagonal transfer continuity of 	
in x, there exists y
0 2 X and a neighbourhood V (x) of x such that 	(z;y
0) > 	(z;z) for
all z 2 V (x). Thus, x 2 int y






int y. Since int y is open in X and X is compact, it can be covered by a ﬁnite number
r of subsets fint y1;:::;int yrg of type int y. Consider a continuous partition of unity








2) supp(hi)  yi; i = 1;:::;r:
Taking into account condition (2) of Theorem 4, if we take A = fy1;:::;yrg 2 hXi, then
there exists a e x 2 X such that
max
y2A
	(e x;y)  	(e x;e x): (6)
Let J = fi 2 f1;:::;rg such that hi(e x) > 0g, then J 6= ;. We have 8i 2 J; hi(e x) > 0;
therefore e x 2 supp(hi)  int yi  yi, 8i 2 J. Consequently, 	(e x;yi) > 	(e x;e x),
8i 2 J. We have J 6= ;, then there exists i 2 J such that hi(e x) > 0, e x 2 yi and yi 2 A.
Since yi 2 A and e x 2 yi, we have 	(e x;yi)  	(e x;e x) and 	(e x;e x) < 	(e x;yi). Then,
we obtain a contradiction: 	(e x;e x) > 	(e x;e x). Therefore, (5) is not true. Hence, 9x 2 X
such that 	(x;y)  	(x;x); 8y 2 X, and sup
y2X
	(x;y) = 	(x;x). According to Lemma
1, x is a Nash equilibrium.
Necessary condition. Suppose that the game (1) has a Nash equilibrium x 2 X. This
assertion is equivalent to sup
y2X
	(x;y) = 	(x;x) (according to Lemma 1). Thus,
8y 2 X;	(x;y)  	(x;x): (7)
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and 8x 2 X, we have max
y2A
	(x;y) > 	(x;x). In other words, for all x 2 X, there exists
y(x) 2 A such that 	(x;y(x)) > 	(x;x). In the last inequality, if we let x = x (the Nash
equilibrium), then there exists a strategy y(x) 2 A such that 	(x;y(x)) > 	(x;x). Let
y = y(x) in inequality (7), then (7) becomes 	(x;y(x))  	(x;x). Therefore, we obtain
a contradiction: 	(x;x) < 	(x;y(x))  	(x;x). Hence, 8A 2 hXi, there exists x 2 X
such that max
y2A
	(x;y)  	(x;x). This completes the proof.
Example 1 (Continued) Let us again consider Example 1, we have for each x = (x1;x2)




The function 	 is continuous over X  X. For any subset f(1y1;2 y2); :::;(ky1;k y2)g of
X, let x = (x1;x2) 2 X such that x1 = max
h=1;:::;k













2   x1 x2
2; 8i = 1;:::;k;
x2 iy2
1  x2 x2
1:
Therefore, 	(x; iy)  	(x;x), 8i = 1;:::;k. According to Theorem 4, this game has a
Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4 can be generalized to the case where the set X is not compact.
Theorem 5 Let X be a nonempty of a topological space E and let 	(x;y) =
n P
i=1
fi(x i;yi) be a real-valued function on X  X. Then, the game (1) has a Nash equi-
librium if and only if there exists a nonempty compact subset X0 of X such that:
(1) 	jX0X(x;y) is a diagonally transfer continuous in x;
(2) there exists y0 2 X such that G(y0) is compact where G(y) = fx 2
X0; 	(x;y)  	(x;x)g;
(3) for each A 2 hXi, 9x 2 X0 such that max
y2A
	(x;y)  	(x;x).
Proof. Necessity. Suppose that the game (1) has a Nash equilibrium x 2 X. Let
X0 = fxg. Then, the set X0 is nonempty compact, and the restricted function 	jX0X is
diagonally transfer continuous in x, and the set G(y) = fx 2 X0; 	(x;y)  	(x;x)g is





	(x;y)  	(x;x) (because x is a Nash equilibrium).
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T
y2X
G(y). Then, there exists y 2 X such that x = 2 G(y), i.e., 	(x;y) > 	(x;x). By the
diagonally transfer continuity of 	 in x, there exists y
0 2 X and a neighbourhood V (x)
of x such that 	(z;y
0) > 	(z;z) for all z 2 V (x). Thus, x = 2 cl G(y
0), a contradiction.
The condition (3) of Theorem 2 imply that fcl G(y); y 2 Xg has the ﬁnite intersection
property and therefore fG(y)\G(y0); y 2 Xg has the ﬁnite intersection property. Since







G(y). Hence, there exists x 2 X0 such that each y 2 X, 	(x;y)  	(x;x).
This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 Assume that Xi is convex and compact, fi is comtinuous and the function
yi 7! fi(x i;yi) is quasiconcave over Xi, 8x i 2 X i, for all i 2 I, then the condition
(2) holds.
Proof. Let A = fy1;:::;ypg be a ﬁnite subset of X and let  be the simplex set of Rp.
 = f = (1;:::;p) 2 R




Let us consider the following multi-valued function.
C : X ! X
deﬁned by





Now we prove in several steps that the function C satisﬁes the conditions of Kakutani’s
ﬁxed point theorem (Kakutani [1941]).




on Rn, so it is continuous on the compact  and by the Weierstrass Theorem, there




















Therefore, yi0 2 C(x). Thus, C(x) 6= ;.
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sumption X is compact, so to prove that Graph(C) is compact, it sufﬁces to prove
that Graph(C) is closed. Indeed, let be (x;z) 2 Graph(C), then there exists a
sequence f(xh;zh)gh1 in Graph(C) which converges to (x;z).











i.e., z 2 C(x). Hence, (x;z) 2 Graph(C), then Graph(C) is closed in X  X.
Thus, the function C is upper semicontinuous on X.
3. 8x 2 X, C(x) is closed in X. Indeed, let x 2 X and z 2 C(x), then there exists a
sequence fzhgh1 in C(x) which converges to z. We have 8h  1; zh 2 C(x), i.e.,




i	(x;yi)  	(x;zh): (9)






Hence, z 2 C(x), i.e., C(x) is closed.
4. 8x 2 X, C(x) is convex in X. Indeed, let x 2 X, z, z 2 C(x) and  2 [0;1].

























i	(x;yi)  	(x;z + (1   )z):
Thus, z + (1   )z 2 C(x).
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i	(e x;yi)  	(e x;e x):
On the other hand, we have max
y2A








¿From Theorems 3-4, we can deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that X is convex and compact and the function f(x;y) is contin-
uous and diagonally transfer quasiconcave in y, then the condition (2) holds.
Proof. Let A = fy1;:::;ypg be a ﬁnite subset of X. Suppose that
8x 2 X; 9i = 1;:::;p such that f(x;yi) > f(x;x): (11)
Then, X can be covered by the sets
i = f x 2 X such that f(x;yi) > f(x;x)g:
Consider a continuous partition of unity fhigi=1;:::;r associated to the ﬁnite covering
f1;:::;pg. Taking into account that f(x;y) is diagonally transfer quasiconcave in y,




f(x;yi)  f(x;x): (12)
Now deﬁne the function  : X ! X by (x) =
p P
i=1
hi(x)xi. Then,  is contin-
uous over X and since X is a nonempty convex and compact, then Brouwer’s The-
orem implies: there exists e z 2 X such that e z = (e z) =
p P
i=1
hi(e z)xi. Let J =
fi 2 f1;:::;ng such that hi(e z) > 0g, then J 6= ;. Since fhigi=1;:::;n is a continuous parti-
tion of unity, consequently e z 2 co(xi; i 2 J). Thus, inequality (12) becomes:
min
i2j
f(e z;yi)  f(e z;e z):
We have 8i 2 J; hi(e z) > 0; therefore e z 2 supp(hi)  i, 8i 2 J. Consequently,
f(e z;yi) > f(e z;e z), 8i 2 J. It follows that min
i2J
f(e z;yi) > f(e z;e z) and then f(e z;e z) <
min
i2J
f(e z;yi)  f(e z;e z). Thus, we obtain a contradiction: f(e z;e z) > 	(e z;e z). Therefore,
(11) is not true. Hence, 9x 2 X such that max
i=1;:::;p
f(x;yi)  f(x;x).
Example 2 Assume that in game (1) n = 2, I = f1;2g, X1 = X2 = [ 1;1], x = (x1;x2)
and
10
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1   2x2
f2(x) = 2x1 + x2
2:
For this example, we have 8i 2 I, the function yi 7! fi(x i;yi) is not quasiconcave
and argmax
y22X2
f2(y2;x1) = f 1;+1g. Therefore, the Friedman theorem (Theorem 1) and
Abalo-Kostreva theorem (Theorem 2) are not applicable.
We have for each x = (x1;x2) and y = (y1;y2)), 	(x;y) = x2y2
1 + y2
2 + 2x1   2x2. The
function 	 is continuous over X  X. And we have for any f(1y1;2 y2); :::;(ky1;k y2)g 
[ 1;1], there exists x = (x1;x2) 2 [ 1;1]2: x1 = max
h=1;:::;k
jhy1j and x2 = max
h=1;:::;k
jhy2j
such that for each i = 1;:::;k, we have iy2
2  x2
2, and jiy1j2  x2
1, since x2  0, then
x2 iy2
1  x2x2
1. Therefore, 	(x; iy)  	(x;x), for each i = 1;:::;k. Since X is compact
and the function 	 is continuous, then according to Theorem 4 the considered game has
a Nash equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the convexity of the strategy sets alone without the quasiconcavity
of the payoff functions is not sufﬁcient for the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Example 3 Assume that in the game (1) n = 2, I = f1;2g, X1 = X2 = [ 1;1],







This game has no Nash equilibrium. Indeed, let x = (x1;x2) 2 X and let yi(x) be the set
of optimal solutions of the optimization problem max
yi2Xi





f+1g if x2 > 0
f 1g if x2 < 0





f 1g if x1 > 0
f+1g if x1 < 0
f 1;1g if x1 = 0:
The game (1) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if the correspondence x 7! 
i2I
yi(x) has
a ﬁxed point. It is clear that the correspondence x 7! (y1(x);y2(x)) has no ﬁxed point in
X.
4. A COMPARISON OF EXISTENCE THEOREMS
In this section, we recall the Nishimura and Friedman theorem for the existence of Nash
equilibrium of the game (1). Following Nishimura and Friedman [1981], let us consider
the following assumptions:
A1. There is a ﬁnite number n of players.
A2. Xi  Rm is compact and convex.
A3. fi(x) is continuous over X.
11
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ri(x i) = fyi 2 Xi; fi(yi;x i) = max
zi2Xi
fi(zi;x i)g; x i 2 X i; i 2 I: (13)
Let us consider the following correspondence deﬁned by:
r : X ! X; x 7! r(x) = 
i2I
ri(x i):
A4. For any x 2 X such that x = 2 r(x) there is at least one player i, a coordinate k and









ik) > 0 holds.
Theorem 6 (Nishimura-Friedman theorem) A game satisfying A1-A4 has a Nash equilib-
rium.
The following example shows that Theorem 6 is not applicable, but that Theorem 4 guar-
antees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.







This game satisﬁes the axioms A1, A2 and A3. We show that the axiom A4 is not satisﬁed.
The negation of A4 is:
A
4. There exists x 2 X such that x = 2 r(x), for each player i, coordinate k and each









ik)  0 holds.





f 1g if 0 < x2  1
f1g if   1  x2 < 0





f 1g if 0 < x1  1
f1g if   1  x1 < 0
f 1;1g if x1 = 0:
It is clear that (0;0) = 2 r(0;0), and let U(0;0) =]   ;[]   ;[ an open neighborhood
of (0;0) with 0 <  < 1 and let  = =2.
Case1. Let i = 1. Consider x1 = (0; ) 2 U(0;0), x2 = (0;) 2 U(0;0). For t1
1 = 1
because x1
2 =   < 0 and t2
1 =  1 because x2





1) =  1 < 0.
Case2. Let i = 2. Consider x1 = (;0) 2 U(0;0), x2 = ( ;0) 2 U(0;0). We have
t1
2 =  1 because x1
1 =  > 0 and t2
2 = 1 because x2





2) =  1 < 0.
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4 issatisﬁed, thusassumptionA4 isnotsatisﬁed. Therefore,
Theorem 6 cannot be applied.
Letusnow showthatalltheconditionsof Theorem 4aresatisﬁed. Indeed, let x = (x1;x2)




The function 	 is continuous over X  X, and we have for any f(1y1;2 y2);
:::;(ky1;k y2)g  [ 1;1]2, there exists x = (x1;x2) 2 [ 1;1]2 such that x1 =
( min
h=1;:::;k
(hy1; hy1))  0 and x2 = ( max
h=1;:::;k









1x2 because   x2  0;
 2iy3
2x1   x1x3











Therefore, 	(x; iy)  	(x;x), for each i = 1;:::;k. Furthermore, X is compact and the
function 	 is continuous. Then, according to Theorem 4 this game has a Nash equilib-
rium.
5. APPLICATION TO AN ECONOMY WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
EXTERNALITIES
The agents of the economy are denoted by the index i, with i 2 I = f1;:::;ng. We con-
sider a simple economy with multilateral externalities. A standard private consumption
good is produced at the nonnegative level yi  0 from the quantity of input ei  0. The
technology is described by a production function yi = gi(ei), and each agent’s prefer-
ences are presented by a quasilinear utility function ui(yi;z) = yi + vi(z) where vi(z) is
i’s disutility function of the level of the externality z =
P
h2I
eh. This model can be seen
as an n-person noncooperative game where the i-th player chooses the input ei and his
utility function is ui. In Chander [2007] and Chander and Tulkens [1997] the existence
of Nash equilibrium of this game is established. In Chander [2007] under the following
assumptions: the strategy sets are compact and convex (intervals of type [0,ei]) the func-
tions gi(ei), vi(z) are twice differentiable, and g0
i(ei) < 0, g00
i(ei) > 0 and v0
i(z) > 0,
v00
i(z)  0. In Chander and Tulkens [1997] similar assumptions are made. Then the
existence of Nash equilibrium is stated as a consequence of Theorem 1. We establish the
existence of Nash equilibrium of this game under signiﬁcantly weaker assumptions.
Assumption 1. gi(ei) and vi(z) are both continuous over [0;+1[.
Assumption 2. There exists a ﬁnite number ei, for each i 2 I such that: for each ej,













eh) holds, for each j  p.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a Nash equilibrium.
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i2I
fgi(di) + vi(di +
P
h6=i
eh)g deﬁned over X  X where X = 
i2I
[0;ei].




1; if 0  e1  1
1; if 1  e1; , g2(e2) =

e2; if 0  e2  4
4; if 4  e2;
u1(x1;z) = y1 + v1(z), where v1(z) = z2 + 3z,
u2(x2;z) = y2 + v2(z), where v1(z) =  z2 + 2z.
We obtain then for e = (e1;e2) and d = (d1;d2):
	(e;d) = 2d
2




2 + (3   2e1)d2 + 2e1   e
2
1:
Then, for each integer p, d1j 2 [0;1] and d2j 2 [0;4], with j  p, there exists e1 =
max
jp
d1j, and e2 = (3   e1)=2 such that 	(e;dj)  	(e;e), for each j  p and since
the functions gi(ei) and vi(z), i = 1;2 are continuous, then according Proposition 4, this
game has a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, it is easy to verify that e = (1;1) is such a point.
6. APPLICATION TO THE EXISTENCE OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM IN STATIC
MODELS
This section is dedicated to examining a simple oligopoly model. We ﬁrst recall the
Cournot model in which the ﬁrms are quantity choosers producing a homogeneous good.
Let p be the market price of a perfectly homogeneous good produced by the n ﬁrms of
an industry, let the sales of the i-th ﬁrm be qi and let Q =
Pn
i=1 qi be total sales in the
market. The inverse demand function is p = F(Q). Costs for the i-th ﬁrm are C(qi) and,
as the individual subscript suggests, need not be identical across ﬁrms. letting the vector
of output levels be q = (q1;:::;qn), the proﬁt of the i-th ﬁrm is i(q) = qiF(Q)   Ci(qi).
A Cournot (or Cournot-Nash) equilibrium is a vector of outputs q 2 Rn
+, such that for













The following assumptions are made.
Assumption 3. F(Q) (and Ci(qi)) are continuous and nonnegative for Q 2 [0;+1[ (for
qi 2 [0;+1[), respectively.
Assumption 4. There exists qi > 0, i = 1;:::;n such that for each z integer, and rji 2











qh)   Ci(qi) holds, for each
j  z.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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qh + ri)   Ci(ri) deﬁned over X  X where X = 
i=1;:::;n
[0;qi].
Example 6 Let us consider the following example. The inverse demand function is




10Q if 0  Q  10
 20Q + 300 if 10  Q  15
0 if 15  Q:
Costs for the i-th ﬁrm (i = 1;2) are Ci(qi) respectively:
C1(q1) = 10q
2








10q1q2 if 0  q1 + q2  10
 30q2
1   20q1q2 + 300q1 if 10  q1 + q2  15
 10q2






1 + 10q1q2 if 0  q1 + q2  10
 28q2
2   20q1q2 + 300q2 if 10  q1 + q2  15
 8q2
2 if 15  q1 + q2
It is clear that the function 2 is not quasiconcave. Let 0  q  15, let X1 = [0;q] and
X2 = [0;15   q], then the game associated to this example is hX1;X2;1;2i.
Then, for each integer z, r1j 2 X1 and r2j 2 X2, with j  z, there exists q = (q1;q2):
1. If for each j  z, r1j  10, then q1 = max
jz
r1j
2. If there exist j such that 10 < r1j  15:
2.1. If q2 2 [15
2 ;15], then q1 = (15   q2)=3
2.2. If q2 2 [0; 15
2 ], then q1 = 10   q2
3. If for each j  z, r2j + q1  10, then q2 = max
jz
r2j
4. If there exist j such that 10 < r2j + q1  15:
4.1. If q1 2 [65
9 ;15], then q2 = (65   5q1)=14
4.2. If q1 2 [0; 65
9 ], then q2 = 10   q1
such that
1(r1j;q2)  1(q1;q2) and 2(q1;r2j)  2(q1;q2); 8j  z:
Thus, 	((q1;q2);(r1j;r2j))  	((q1;q2);(q1j;q2)), 8j  z where 	((q1;q2);(r1;r2)) =
1(r1;q2)+2(q1;r2). Since the functions i(q), i = 1;2 are continuous, then according
to Proposition 5 this game has a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Indeed, q = (5=2;15=2) is
such a point.
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We have provided new necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in n-person games with non-convex strategy sets. This shows that some of the
key assumptions still widely used in the literature on the existence of Nash equilibria can
be substantially weakened. We have also developed examples where these more general
results are applicable, but the current theorems for the Nash equilibrium fail to hold. This
clearly shows that these generalized results enlarge the class of games for which a Nash
equilibrium exists.
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